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The rapid growth of the information and communication technology has made 
it possible for everyone to search information, gain knowledge, and generate 
eficiency in their work in such a way that we never dreamed of a decade ago. 
Another shift has occurred in the digital world where it reflects a growing 
interest in new surveillance technologies, be it relating to personal or company's 
data. This interest is based on various reasons; it enables the companies to 
monitor work performance, maintain employees' discipline and productivity, 
and introduce e-commerce transaction in the company. Those new technologies 
include video surveillance, smart card, face recognition, and biometrics. Many 
countries are also developing new identification and authentication systems, 
such as smart cards and digital identification cards. Austria is promoting a new 
social security smart card; Singapore also created "SingPassJ' and Malaysia 
has established "Mykad", a universal purpose ID card. These collections 
of data have signijcant importance regarding the issues of its security and 
individual privacy. Furthermore, the Malaysian Federal Constitution does not 
specifically recognise privacy as one of tlze fundamental rights and the Personal 
Data Protection Bill is yet to be enforced. As such, this paper will discuss the 
extent of protection available to the workers relating to their privacy under 
related laws in Malaysia. 
PRIVACY DEFINED 
Definitions of privacy vary widely according to context and environment, 
. and in many countries the concept has been fused with data protection, which 
interprets privacy in terms of management of personal information. Protection 
of privacy is basically the limit at how far society can intrude into a person's 
affairs. In the 1890s, United States Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis 
. (Wasren & Bandeis, 1980) articulated a concept of privacy that urged that it 
was the individual's right to be left alone. Brandeis argued that privacy was 
the most cherished of freedoms in a democracy, and he was concerned that it 
should be reflected in the Constitution. According to Bloustein (1964), privacy 
is an interest of the human personality. It protects the inviolate personality, the 
individual's independence, dignity and integrity. Smith (2000) defined privacy as 
"the desire by each of us for physical space where we can be free of interruption, 
intrusion, embarrassment, or accountability and the attempt to control the time 
and manner of disclosures of personal information about ourselves." 
Privacy is the expectation that confidential personal information disclosed 
in a private place will not be disclosed to third parties, when the disclosure would 
cause either embarrassment or emotional distress to a person of reasonable 
sensitivities (Standler, 1997). The right of privacy is restricted to individuals who 
are in a place that a person would reasonably expect to be private for example in 
home, hotel room, telephone booth, etc. There is no protection for information 
that either is a matter of public record or when the victim voluntarily discloses 
it in a public place. People should be protected by privacy when they believe 
that the conversation is private and cannot be heard by others who are acting 
in a lawful manner (Standler, 1997). 
The right to privacy has been expressed as a fundamental human right. 
Article 12 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted in 
1948, proclaims that: "No one should be subjected to arbitrary interference 
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks on his honor 
and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of law against such 
interference or attacks". However, the Federal Constitution of Malaysia does not 
specifically recognise the right to privacy, but does provide for several related 
rights, including freedom of assembly, speech, and association. Whilst freedom 
of movement is protected in article 9 of Federal Constitution, it, however, 
states that: (1) No citizen shall be banished or excluded from the Federation, (2) 
Subject to Clause (3) and to any law relating to the security of the Federation 
or any part thereof, public order, public health, or the punishment of offenders, 
every citizen has the right to move freely throughout the Federation and to reside 
in any part thereof and (3) So long as under this Constitution any other State is 
in a special position as compared with the States of Malaya, Parliament may 
by law impose restrictions, as between that State and other States, on the rights 
conferred by Clause (2) in respect of movement and residence. 
Further, article 10 of the Federal Constitution provides: Subject to 
Clause (2), (3) and (4), (a) every citizen has the right to freedom of speech and 
expression; (b) all citizens have the right to assemble peaceably and without 
arms; and (c) all citizens have the right to form associations. 
However, certain restrictions regarding the above rights may be imposed 
by the law in order to safeguard the interest and security of the Federation and 
to maintain public order. In other words, rights granted under Article 10 are not 
absolute. There are laws limiting the rights protected in Article 10, those laws 
to clarify the position in Malaysia regarding freedom of speech and expression 
which is actually a limitation on the law of privacy for example the Official 
Secrets Act 1972 as opposed to the rights of disclosure of public servants. This 
is more for protecting government privacy rather than employees. Other related 
statutes also limit the rights of individual privacy, for instance, section 39 of the 
Anti-Corruption Act 1997, section 245 up to section 247 of Communication and 
Multimedia Act 1998, section 30 of Internal Security Act 1960, section lO(2) 
and (3) Computer Crimes Act 1997, and Anti Money Laundering Act 2000. 
These provisions showed that rights to privacy are recognised but limited in its 
application. 
PRIVACY AT THE WORKPLACE: AN INTRODUCTION 
Employees around the world are normally subjected to some kind of monitoring 
by their employers. For various reasons, employers collect personal information 
from employees, such as health care, tax, and background checks. Traditionally, 
this monitoring and information gathering in the workplace involved some 
form of human intervention and either the consent, or at least the knowledge, of 
employees. The changing structure and nature of the workplace, however, has led 
to more invasive and often, covert, monitoring practices which call into question 
employees' most basic right to privacy and dignity within the workplace. Progress 
in technology has facilitated an increasing level of automated surveillance. Now, 
the supervision of employee performance, behaviour, and communications can 
be carried out by technological means, with increased ease and efficiency. The 
technology currently being developed is extremely powerful and can extend to 
every aspect of a worker's life. Soft~vare programs can record keystrokes on 
computers and monitor exact screen images, telephone management systems can 
analyse the pattern of telephone use and the destination of calls, and miniature 
cameras and Smart ID card can monitor an employee's behaviour, movement, 
and even physical orientation. 
The usage of the Internet, the numerous websites and e-mails has 
contributed to the efficiency and excellence in business. These tools are relatively 
cheap, quick, and an easy form of communication. However, the availability 
of e-mail and other form of communication technologies posted considerable 
opportunities for misuse. For instance, a study by Girald (1997) suggests that 
more than 30% of all email messages sent by employees are non work related. 
Similarly, the IDC Research survey 1999 reported that 30-40% of Internet 
access within the corporate workplace is not business related (Draycott, 2000). 
However, the recent self-report Elron study 2000 (Draycott, 2000) of corporate 
htemet usage revealed a more alarming figure. Out of 576 respondents who have 
access to the Internet and e-mail at work, more than 85% of them had used these 
facilities for personal matters. Secure Computing survey 2000 confirmed these 
findings of non-work related use of the Internet and e-mail, when they reported 
that 50% visited pornographic sites, 92% bought goods online, 84% searched for 
jobs online, and 54% visited chat rooms whilst at work (Harnin, 2001). 
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP 
The doctrine of vicarious liability applies to all forms of torts. The employer 
will be exposed to legal risk of potential civil claims for example contract, tort 
of negligence, defamation, sexual harassment, or potential criminal actions 
for publication of obscene materials. Many reasons have been put forward in 
justification of this doctrine, some of which are that a master is to be held liable 
for employing a negligent employee; for failure to control the employee. Since 
the master derives benefit from the employee's work, he should be made liable 
for any tortious conduct of the employee in the performance of his work. Another 
reason is because the master is in a better financial standing to compensate the 
third party. This last reason ensures, if nothing else, that the third party will in 
fact receive compensation for his injuries and the doctrine therefore secures 
actual compensation to the tort victim (Talib, 2003). 
The general basis for the liability of employers for the conduct of 
employees may be drawn from the principle of either direct or indirect 
(vicarious) liability. The former refers to the liability that is attached to the 
organisation or a company when they themselves direct or authorise the 
employee to act in a certain way. In Tesco Supermarkets Limited v Nattrass 
[I 9721 AC 153 Lord Reid held that this direct liability occurs when a person is 
not acting as a servant, representative, agent or delegate of the company but 
as an embodiment of the company. 
On the other side of the fence, vicarious liability may be attached to 
employers for the acts of their employees in the course of their employment. 
The key question for such liability is whether the employee was acting in the 
course of his employment at the time in question. In Jones v Tower Boot Co 
Ltd. [I9971 IRLR 168 the Court of Appeal held that this phrase should be given 
its ordinary meaning and should not be construed restrictively. Latham CJ 
applied a broad interpretation of the concept in Deatons Property Ltd v Flew 
[I9491 79 CLR 370 where His Lordship held that an act is within the scope 
of his employment if the employee was retained to perform the act, or if its 
performance is reasonably incidental to the matters which the employee was 
retained to do. 
WORKPLACE SEARCH 
The US Supreme Court has held that whether an employee has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a workspace is to be decided on a case-by-case 
basis because of the great variety of workplace settings as was held in the 
case of O'Connor v. Ortega 480 U.S. 709. The Court also held that a public 
employer's intrusions, even into constitutionally protected privacy interests 
of government employees for either non-investigatory, work-related purposes 
or for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged under 
a standard of reasonableness. The Court noted that the requirement for an 
employer to obtain a warrant whenever he or she wished to enter an employee's 
workspace for work-related purpose would seriously disrupt business routine 
and be unduly burdensome. In terms of workplace computer search, in the case 
Leventhal v. Knapek 266 F.3d 64, the Federal Court has held that an employee 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of an office computer, 
but an investigatory search for evidence of work-related employee misconduct 
is constitutionally reasonable if the search is justified at its inception and is of 
appropriate scope (i.e., reasonably related to the objectives of the search and 
not excessively intrusive in light of the nature of the misconduct). 
In the private sector, employees may have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in certain areas and personal items. In K-Mart Corp. v. Trotti 677 
S.W.2d 632, the court has held that an employee who is under no suspicion of 
wrongdoing and secures a locker with her own lock and with the employer's 
consent has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the locker and its contents. 
In addition, employers may be liable if they reveal confidential information 
about their employees as decided in Miller v. Motorola, Inc. 560 N.E.2d 900 
(Ill. App. 1990). 
WORKPLACE SURVEILLANCE 
Video surveillance to monitor the activities of employees is rampantly used 
by employers. An employer's use of video surveillance is permissible in US, 
where US courts have examined an employee's expectation of privacy in the 
area being monitored, as well as considered any applicable laws or regulations 
governing such a search. Federal courts have held almost unanimously that silent 
video surveillance is not prohibited by Title I of the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986. But video surveiilance that includes the ability 
to record conversations would violate Title I. This was decided in the case of 
Thompson v. Johnson Count?, Communit?, College, 930 F. Supp. 501 (D. Kan. 
1996). 
Video surveillance is used extensively for many different reasons. 
Australia spent substantially more money per capita than any other industrialised 
nation on video surveillance equipment. Video cameras are now one of the most 
commonly used surveillance devices in the Australian workplace, and their use is 
regulated by The Workplace Video Surveillance Act of 1998. Video surveillance 
is justified as a security measure to deter theft, vandalism, or other unauthorised 
"trusions, and to monitor employee conformance with occupational health and 
safety procedures, as well as general performance. 
The use of video cameras and closed circuit televisions (CCTV) is another 
way of monitoring employees within the workplace. Even areas where 
employees would previously have enjoyed high expectations of privacy, such 
as bathrooms or locker rooms, have come under increasing surveillance. Postal 
workers in New York City found hidden cameras in restroom stalls and waiters 
in the Boston Sheraton were secretly videotaped in the hotel locker room. Where 
staffs are more mobile, companies are now using a range of technologies to 
track geographic movements (Hartmann, 1999). Some hospitals now require 
nurses to wear badges on their uniforms so they can be located constantly 
(Auchard, 2001). 
TELEPHONE MONITORING 
Employers have broad discretion to monitor employees' calls for business 
purposes. A British program called Watcall, produced by a company called 
Harlequin, can analyse telephone calls and group them intofriendship networks 
to determine patterns of use. Voice mail systems are also subject to systematic 
or random monitoring by managers (Davies, 1997). In US, Title II of the ECPA 
has numerous exceptions. In the workplace, two exceptions are most often cited. 
The first exception is consent by one-party, as the ECPA provides that aparty to 
the communication may intercept and may give prior consent to intercept, even 
when the other party is unaware of the interception. This one-party consent need 
not be express and may be implied from surrounding circumstances, including 
knowledge of the interception. The second exception, which is often termed 
the ordinary course of business exception, allows the use of: any telephone 
or telegraph instrument, equipment, or facility, or any component thereof, (i) 
furnished to the user by a provider of wire or electronic communication service 
in the ordinary course of its business or (ii) being used by a provider of wire 
or electronic service in the ordinary course of its business. 
Referring to the case of Watkins v. L. M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577 
(1 lth Cir. 1983), where the defendant Berry Co. employed plaintiff Carmie 
Watkins to sell advertising by telephone from Berry Co.'s office. Berry Co. 
had "an established policy, of which all employees are informed, of monitoring 
all solicitation calls as part of its regular training program." Employees were 
permitted to make personal calls, but were not told whether those calls would 
be monitored. A friend telephoned Ms. Watkins at work about a new job, and 
Berry Co. monitored the call. Ms. Watkins sued. The District Court granted 
summary judgment for Berry & Co., finding both implied consent and a 
business interest in the monitoring. The Court of Appeals reversed. "Consent 
is not to be cavalierly implied. Title Ill expresses a strong purpose to protect 
individual privacy by strictly limiting the occasion on which interception may 
lawfully take place . . . Knowledge of the capability of monitoring alone cannot 
be considered implied consent", the learned trial judge said. As for the ordinary 
course of business exception, the Court stated: 
It is not enough for Berry Co, to claim that its general policy is 
justifiable as part of the ordinary course of business. We have 
no doubt that it is. The question before us, rather, is whether the 
interception of this call was in the ordinary course of business. 
In the ordinary course of business" cannot be expanded to mean 
anything that interests a company. We hold that a personal call may 
not be intercepted in the ordinary course of business ... except to the 
extent necessary to guard against unauthorized use of the telephone 
or to determine whether a call is personal or not. In other words, a 
personal call may be intercepted in the ordinary course of business 
to determine its nature but never its contents. (p. 582, 583). 
In Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1992) plaintiff Sibbie Deal 
was employed in a store owned by defendants Newell and Juanita Spears. 
The defendants asked Ms. Deal "to cut down on her use of the store phone 
for personal calls, and the Spearses told her they might resort to monitoring 
calls" Later, the store was burglarised. "The Spearses believed it was an inside 
job and suspected ... Deal". " The Spearses then installed a tape recorder for 
calls in the store, with no indication to the parties using the phone that their 
conversation was being recorded. Over seven weeks, the Spearses taped 22 
hours of Ms. Deal's calls, including sexually provocative conversations with 
a non-employee. Ms. Deal sued. The Spearses' defences included consent and 
ordinary course of business. At trial, the District Court rejected the defences 
and awarded $40,000 in statutory damages plus attorneys' fees. The Eighth 
Circuit affirmed. On consent, the Court stated that: 
The Spearses did not inform Deal that they were monitoring the 
phone, but only told her they might do so in order to cut down on 
personal calls. Moreover, ... the couple anticipated Deal would not 
suspect that they were intercepting her calls, since they hoped to 
catch her making an admission about the burglary ... (p. 1157). 
And as for ordinary course of business, the Court said that: 
The Spearses had a legitimate business reason for listening in: 
they suspected Deal's involvement in a burglary ... and hoped 
she would incriminate herself. Moreover, Deal was abusing her 
privileges by using the phone for numerous personal calls ... when 
there were customers in the store. The Spearses might legitimately 
have monitored Deal's calls to the extent necessary to determine 
that the calls were personal and made or received in violation of 
store policy. But, the Spearses recorded twenty-two hours of calls, 
and . . . listened to all of them.. . , Deal might have mentioned the 
burglary at any time during the conversations, but we do not believe 
that the Spearses' suspicions justified the extent of the intrusion. 
The scope of the interception in this case takes us well beyond the 
boundaries of the ordinary course of business (p. 1 158). 
Based on the above cases, a few principles have been established by the a 
Courts in US. Firstly, employer ownership of the communications equipment 
alone is not carte blanche to intercept employees' communications. Secondly, 
the ordinary course of business exception often requires an employer (as the 
equipment's owner) to prove: (a) it had a particular reason for intercepting 
particular communications, and (b) it took reasonable steps to intercept ' 
nothing more. In other words, this exception does not always allow blanket 
interception, especially of employees personal communications. Thirdly, ' 
implied consent must be based upon employees' clear and prior knowledge that 
their communications will be intercepted. Knowledge that communications can 
be or might be intercepted is likely insufficient. 
E-MAIL AND INTERNET USE MONITORING 
Computers and networks are particularly conducive to surveillance. The 
Privacy Foundation study in 2001 (Schulman, 2001) showed that 14 million 
employees in the US are subject to this kind of surveillance on a continuous 
basis. Employers can monitor e-mail messages by randomly reviewing e-mail 
transmissions, by specifically reviewing transmissions of certain employees, 
or by selecting key terms to flag e-mail. So'me programs used by employers 
can even use algorithms to analyse communication patterns and turn them into 
images. Monitors can then look at these images to follow traffic patterns and 
detect whether sensitive data is at risk. 
Many employers rely on software for remote monitoring of e-mail 
messages. With a few clicks they can see every e-mail message that employees 
send or receive and determine whether they are legitimate or not. Employers 
give a variety of reasons for installing such software. Some say it is to protect 
trade secrets or preventing sexual harassment incidents. Others want to prevent 
oversised-mails clogging networks and using too much bandwidth. Still others 
simply that they do not want employees wasting company time by using these 
systems for personal activities. 
According to the American Management Association (200 I), nearly 
two thirds of all companies discipline employees for abuse of e-mail or Internet 
connections and 27% had dismissed employees for those reasons. In 2000, Dow 
Chemical Company fired 50 US employees and threatened 200 others with 
suspension after they found offensive material in their e-mail. The company 
opened the personal e-mail of more than 7,000 employees. Similarly, the New 
York Times fired 23 employees in 1999 for sending obscene messages. 
In 2000, Hong Kong the Office of the Privacy Commissioner for Personal 
Data (2000) commissioned a survey to examine employer surveillance in the 
workplace. According to the survey, 64% of employers had installed at least 
one type of employee monitoring equipment, but only 18% of the employers 
had a written policy on employee monitoring. Furthermore, 35% of respondents 
did'not even know whether such a policy existed. 
In contrast, France has established stringent policies that protect the 
privacy of employees' e-mail usage. The French Supreme Court held recently in 
the case of Nikon v. Onof, Decision No. 4164, October 2,2001 (99-42.942) that 
employers do not have the right to open any of their employees' messages. The 
Court ruled in a case between Nikon and a former employee that the company 
had no automatic right to search through an e-mail inbox. 
Courts in the US have taken various positions in cases involving an 
employee's use of e-mail and the Internet at work. In Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 
914 F.Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996), the Court found that an at-will employee has 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of an e-mail voluntarily 
sent on an employer's e-mail system, even though the employer had assured 
its employee's that e-mail communications would remain confidential and 
privileged. The court reasoned that once an employee communicated comments 
to a second person over an e-mail system utilised by the entire company, any 
reasonable expectation of privacy is lost. And even if an employee had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of an e-mail, a reasonable 
person would not consider an employer's interception of such communications 
to be substantial or highly offensive. In another case of United States v, Simons, 
206 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2000) it was held that an employer that has a business 
use only policy for Internet usage may conduct audits of its computer network 
to identify, terminate, and prosecute unauthorised activity. The court found 
that. while employees may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their 
computer equipment, some office practices, regulations, or procedures may 
reduce such an expectation. 
Title III of ECPA on definition of electronic communication includes 
e-mail and Internet use. However, the Title 111 definition contains a major hole: 
electronic communications not include such communications in electronic 
storage. In Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 36 F.3d 
457 (5th Cir. 1994), plaintiff Steve Jackson Games, Inc. (SJGI) had an electronic 
bulletin board which offered customers the ability to send and receive private 
E-mail. Private E-mail was stored ... temporarily until the addressees 'called' 
... (using their computers and modems) and read their mail". Defendant 
United States Secret Service read "162 items of unread, private E-mail". SJGI 
sued. The District Court entered judgment for the Secret Service on SJGI's 
Title ID claims, because the e-mail was not acquired by the Secret Service 
"contemporaneous with the transmission of these communications". The Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed and observed that unlike the definition of 
'wire communication' the definition of 'electronic communication' does not 
include electronic storage of such communications". 
Likewise, in Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 ESupp. 1232, 1236 (D. Nev. 
1996) the city's police department had an Alphupage system. A police officer 
could communicate with another officer by typing on a keyboard connected to 
a computer. The police chief had warned all users that every message is logged 
on the network. However, the chief had not warned officers that messages 
were automatically stored, and it was unclear what officers understood. The 
city retrieved old, stored messages for use in an internal affairs proceeding. 
Citing Title m, two officers moved to enjoin such use. The District Court 
denied the motion: 
All messages are recorded and stored not because anyonelis 
tapping the system, but simply because that's how the system 
works. It is an integral part of the technology ... E-mail messages 
are, by definition, stored in a routing computer. An electronic 
communication may be put into electronic storage, but the storage 
is not itself part of the communication. The statutes therefore 
distinguish the "interception" of an electronic communication at 
the time of transmission from the retrieval of such a communication 
after it has been put into "electronic storage" (p. 1234- 1236). 
In Garrity v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 18 ZER Cases 
981 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2002), two insurance company employees obtained and 
distributed sexually explicit e-mails through the company's electronic system. 
A co-worker complained to management of receiving such emails, prompting 
an immediate investigation, which resulted in checking the employees' e-mail 
folders as well as the folders of fellow co-workers to whom they had previously 
sent e-mails. The two implicated employees claimed that their personal e-mail 
was private since the company had encouraged them to have personal passwords 
and set up personal emaiI folders. Despite these contentions, the federal district 
court found that this expectation of privacy was unreasonable for several 
reasons. One of the most important reasons behind the court's decision was the 
company's detailed, published e-mail policy in which employees were told that 
certain e-mails were not allowed on the company system and that violation of 
this policy could result in disciplinary action up to and including termination of 
employment. The court also relied on a series of cases from other jurisdictions, 
which stated that even in the absence of such a company policy, the voluntary 
submission of personal comments over a system used by the entire company 
negates any privacy interests in such communications. Additionally, the court 
rejected any notion that by creating a personal password or folder, employers 
forfeit the right of inspection of email files used by employees but maintained 
by the company. Lastly the court held that even if a reasonable expectation of 
privacy could be found, the employer's legitimate business interest in protecting 
employees from harassment trumps these privacy interests. Allowing employees 
to use a company e-mail system to distribute offensive or harassing materials to 
fellow co-workers, could subject employers to potential liability for harassment 
or other forms of discrimination. Thus, an employer's interest in preventing the 
dissemination of certain materials is clearly legitimate. 
Garrity's case may serve as a guideline for employers and courts alike 
- particularly since more private sector employers are publishing company 
policies that limit employees' expectations of privacy, even where privacy 
might normally be presumed. 
These abovementioned cases raise complex legal and ethical questions 
concerning an employee's fundamental right to privacy and due process, 
such as: what if an employee is sent an ofSensive e-mail, accidentally or 
maliciously? The e-mail cannot simply be deleted. It remains logged on the 
company server, threatening the relationship of trust between employee and 
management. Or what if an employee is dismissed on the grounds of sensitive 
personal information (for example issues relating to sexual preferences, medical 
conditions, etc.) gathered through a system? This problem also arises when 
companies monitor all Internet activity looking for visits to inappropriate sites. 
Such surveillance has elements in common with traditional surveillance for hard 
copy pornography, but there are significant dangers to workers in the realm of 
electronic surveillance. An employee may accidentally visit a pornographic 
site upon opening a spam e-mail that links to such a site. Or websites may be 
accidentally visited when displayed as a hit in response to a perfectly innocent 
search query. The surveillance technology does not, however, distinguish 
between an innocent mistake and an intentional visit. 
The monitoring of chat room visits has also created some distress at the 
workplace. There is an increasing trend among companies to dismiss or sue 
employees for divulging company trade secrets or defaming the company 
in chat rooms. These have become known as John Doe cases. Because most 
people log on to chat rooms anonymously or use an alias, once a company 
observes a certain party in a chat room engaging in illegitimate speech, they 
must subpoena the message-board services such as Yahoo! or America Online, 
to obtain the identity of the specific author. The service providers often turn 
over identifying information when presented with a subpoena without any 
notice to the individual. The number of these cases is rapidly increasing and 
threatens not only the privacy of employees but also their rights to anonymity 
and free speech. 
Employers and employees are concerned about computers in the workplace. 
Employers worry that employees waste time, such as, by chatting or shopping 
on-line. Employers worry too that employees create liability by viewing and 
circulating pornographic, racist, or other improper material. 
WORKPLACE PRIVACY IN MALAYSIA: THE LAWS 
As mentioned earlier, the Federal Constitution of Malaysia does not specifically 
recognise the right to privacy, but does provide for several related rights, including 
freedom of assembly, speech, and movement under Article 10 of the Federal 
Constitution. Other related statutes also limit the rights of individual privacy, 
for instance, section 39 of the Anti-Corruption Act 1997 empowers the Attorney 
General to authorise the interception of mail and the wiretapping of telephones in 
corruption investigations. Section 234 of Communications and Multimedia Act 
I 998 prohibits unlawful interception of communications, and under section 245 up 
to section 247, further establishes rules for search of computers, mandates access 
to encryption keys, and authorises police to intercept communications without 
a warrant if a public prosecutor believes a communication is likely to contain 
information relevant to an investigation. However, in practice, the provisions of 
the Communication and Multimedia Act 1998 restricting telecommunications 
interception appear to be regularly ignored or overridden by other statutes, 
including section 30 of Internal Security Act 1960 and section lO(2) and (3) 
Computer Crimes Act 1997. Last but not least, the newly introduced Anti Money 
Laundering Act 2000 as well empowers the intrusion of individual privacy 
especially relating to their bank account. These provisions show that rights to 
privacy are recognised but limited in its application. 
WORKPLACE PRIVACY: THE MALAYSIAN POSITION 
With regard to privacy of employee in workplace, there is no specific law that 
governs this issue. The former Deputy Prime Minister, Datuk Seri Abdullah Hj. 
Ahmad Badawi (2002) in a press conference stated that there is no specific law 
to allow the termination of ontract of service of any public servant who surfs 
obscene websites by using office computers during working hours. He added that 
only a disciplinary action can be taken against the public servant for misusing 
office facilities. However, Executive Director of Malaysian Employers Federation 
(MEF), Encik Sharnsuddin Bardan insisted and suggested that employees who 
surf obscene websites during office hours should be terminated for misusing 
office facilities (Utusan Malaysia, 2002). As such, action can still be taken against 
any Malaysian employees who misuse any office facilities for personal use. In 
other words, the employees are subject to any surveillance and monitoring by 
their employer. 
However, 38% of Malaysian employees believed that their data are safe 
and are not being misused by their employer. This was based on the survey by 
Asian Ideal Mastercard (2001). On the other hand, Malaysian employees are 
very cautious in using the telephone for personal use since they believed their 
conversations are open to interception by their employer (Utusan Malaysia, 
2001). 
MALAYSIA PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION BILL 
The Ministry of Energy, Communications, and Multimedia has tabled a new 
piece of legislation on Personal Data Protection where the aim of the Bill is to 
regulate the collection, possession, processing, and use of personal data by any 
personlorganisation so as to provide protection for an individual's personal data 
and safeguard the privacy of an individual, and to establish a set of common 
rules and guidelines on handling and treatment of personal data by any person1 
organisation. 
Under this Bill, the term personal data is defined to mean any information 
recorded in a document in which it can practically be processed wholly or 
partly by any automatic means or otherwise which relates directly or indirectly 
to a living individual who is identified or identifiable from that information or 
from that and other information in the possession of the data user including any 
expression of opinion about the individual and any indication of the intentions 
of the data user in respect of that individual. (S 2 of the Bill) The bill further 
defines the term data subject and data user. Data subject means "an individual 
who is the subject of personal data" (S 2 of the Bill) and data user means "a 
person who either alone or jointly with other persons, controls the collection, 
holding, processing or use of the personal data but does not include any person 
who collects, holds, processes or uses solely on behalf of another person" (S 2 
of the Bill). As such, those who collect materials for a third party will not fall 
under the definition. 
Any type of processing of personal data will have to be in compliance 
with all the data principles. Here, the term process is defined widely to mean, 
"the carrying out of any operation or set of operation on any personal data and 
includes recording, amendment, deletion, organisation, adaptation, alteration, 
retrieval, consultation, alignment, combination, blocking, erasure, destruction or 
dissemination of the personal data" (S 2 of the Bill). This means that where files 
are only retrieved, it is already considered as being processed, and therefore is 
subjected to those data principles. S 4 of the Bill requires that all data principles 
in the schedule is to be complied with whenever any personal data is collected, 
held, processed, or used by a data user. These principles are: 
(1) Principle 1 - Manner of collection of personal data. Data must be collected 
fairly and lawfully. The data user must also be informed of when and 
what personal data is collected and the purpose for which the personal data 
are to be used. 
(2) Principle 2 - F'urpose of collection of personal data. The purpose of collecting 
the data must be specified and lawful. In this regard, the collection of data is 
lawful if it relates directly to a function or activity of the data user, or necessary 
for that purpose. The data collected must also be adequate, relevant, and not 
excessive in relation to the purpose. 
(3) Principle 3 - Use of personal data. Personal data collected must only be used 
for the purpose in which the data is collected or any other purposes directly 
related to that. Once the purpose of collecting the information ceases, the 
personal data must be erased, unless such erasure is prohibited under any 
law or against public interest. 
(4) Principle 4 - Disclosure of data. Personal data must not to be disclosed unless 
in relation to the purpose in which it is collected. In relation to this, s 42 
contains certain exceptions such as: (a) the data subject or relevant person 
has consented to the disclosure, (b) the disclosure is necessary for the purpose 
of preventing or detecting crime, (c) disclosure is required under the law, or 
(dis)closure is justified as being in the public interest. 
The data subject may withdraw his consent for the disclosure of his personal 
data. In this instance, the data user has a duty to cease to hold, process, or use, the 
personal data. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, most employers believe that since they have ownership or control , 
over the working premises, and its contents and facilities, that employees give up ' 
all rights and expectations to privacy and freedom from invasion. Others simply 
avoid the question by making employees consent to surveillance, monitoring, and 
testing as a condition of employment. However, we have seen that various countries 
in the world recognise the privacy of the employees in their workplace, though, 
of course, this is not absolute. In the US, ECPA is one piece of a very important 
legislation that recognizes the right of privacy in general, though the courts have 
typically been slow to recognize employees' rights to privacy. In Whalen v. Roe 
429 U.S. 589 (1977) a constitutional right to information privacy is recognised and 
it was held that it can protect against employer disclosures of employees' personal 
information. 
In European countries (European Commission, 2002), the collection and 
processing of personal information is protected by the EU Data Protection and the 
Telecommunication Privacy Directives. For example, Austria, Germany, Norway, 
and Sweden have strong labour codes and privacy laws that directly or indirectly 
prohibit or restrict this kind of surveillance. In Finland, a new law on Data Protection 
in Working Life entered into force in October 200 1. In October 2000, the United 
Kingdom Privacy Commissioner issued The Employment Practices Data Protection 
Code, a draft code of guidance for employer/employee relationships. In 1999, the 
Swedish government established a Committee to study workplace privacy issues. 
In March 2002, the Committee issued a proposal recommending specific legislation 
to protect the personal information of current employees, former employees and 
employment applicants in both the private and public sectors. 
In Asia, Hong Kong had formed in June 2002, the Hong Kong Data 
Protection Commission and issued a draft code of practice on workplace for public 
consultation (2002). The draft code covers telephone, closed-circuit television, 
e-mail and computer usage and possibly location monitoring. In Australia, the 
Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act 2000 put in place limit restrictions 
on employers monitoring of communications by requiring the establishment of 
formal e-mail use policies that must be made clear to all employees. It also requires 
employers to prove that the monitoring of e-mails is justifiable-for instance, on 
grounds of employees' excessive use of e-mail, distributing offensive material, 
suspected criminal activities, or passing on of sensitive information (Law Reform 
Commission New South Wales, 200 1). 
As such, it is a lauded move by the government of Malaysia to introduce 
Personal Data Protection Bill or any law which has the same effect of Personal Data 
Protection 1998 in UK or ECPA in US which clearly provide for the protection 
of individual privacy. It is submitted that the protection should be put into piece 
of legislation, not by just self regulation. To support, in McVeigh v. Cohen, 983 F. 
Supp. 215,220 (D.D.C. 1998) the Court observed: 
. . . in these days of 'big brother', where through technology and 
otherwise, the privacy interests of individuals from all walks of life are 
being ignored or marginalized, it is imperative that statutes explicitly 
protecting these rights be strictly observed. 
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